File Name: justice and development party in turkey .zip
- Rural roots of the rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey
- Justice and Development Party
- Turkey’s Political Parties
- Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
Unlike its predecessors, the AKP did not centre its image around an Islamic identity; indeed, its leaders underscored that it was not an Islamist party and emphasized that its focus was democratization, not the politicization of religion. In spite of the fact that the AKP was a relatively new party, it won enough seats in the November parliamentary elections to earn an absolute majority in the seat parliament. The next year the AKP was broadly successful in municipal elections. In response to the subsequent stalemate, early general elections were held in July of that year and yielded an overwhelming victory for the AKP.
Rural roots of the rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey
The Justice and Development Party Turkey is a political Islamist group that came to power in through democratic elections. We shall discuss their rise to power, their policies during their time in office, which will include a discussion of issues on religion and governance, as well as an analysis of more recent events in Turkey related to the party.
We shall also discuss the leader of the AKP Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and not only his rise to power, but also, his increased authoritarian. The history of the AKP party in Turkey must be understood within the overall history of Turkey, and more specifically, the relationship between the secular government and political Islamist movements.
Since, Ataturk , the Turkish government has been adamant about protecting the principles of Kemalism which include secularism. It was even written into the Turkish constitution. But for many who believed in the Ottoman system, this new attention to secularism was un-comforting, to say the least. It must be remembered that while Kemalism clearly did change Turkey, much of the change was at the top the national levels.
The rise of a multiparty system in the mid s allowed for critiques of the Republican Party to challenge their rule. For the Islamists, where there were clear pro-religious positions and viewpoints within many in the opposition, as well as a number of those in Turkish civil society, the rise of political Islam in Turkey and the Middle East in general for the most part took off in the late s and the s with exceptions like the Muslim Brotherhood , with a much earlier organized history in Egypt.
However, like other areas in the Middle East, Turkey saw the rise of Islamist parties in the s onwards. Namely, the Constitutional Court banned the National Order Party in , and then the National Salvation Party in , both for going against the constitutional principles of secularism. Interestingly, it is pointed out that these closures of Islamist parties, while splitting members within the groups, did actually lead to more moderate new parties.
So, in the case of Turkey, the Islamists did not go away, nor did they turn to violent extremism. Rather, they believed that success in the elections would need to come from a more moderate position. What we see is that this, coupled with other factors, led to a more moderate, and quickly successful moderate Islamist party, the AKP Justice and Development.
While Islamist parties have existed in Turkey as early as the s and of course the secular state and military was concerned about this , the secularists felt much more political pressure by the Islamists in the s. Until then, the Islamists either had a poorer electoral showing, or they were quickly shut down by secular forces in Turkey. However, the newer manifestation of the early Islamist parties—the Welfare Party—in , won local elections in Istanbul, and Ankara, which sent shockwaves to the secularists in government.
The military, feeling a wave of Islamism overtaking or potentially overtaking Turkey , decided to stop the Welfare Party before they could change Turkey.
Thus, they decided to ban the party in But, for these members of the now banned Virtue Party, they were willing to do so. In , the group the Justice and Development AKP won the most seats of any political party in the Turkish elections, thus ushering in a new period of what was now Islamist rule.
Many were willing to support this party, given their attention to Islamic issues, but just as important, their attention to democratic reform. There has not been a significant push for notions of Islamic law in Turkish society, nor was there an overt demand for more Islam in government. Following the coming to power of the AKP, they began a series of democratic reforms within Turkey. Democratizing has been one of the key conditions by Europe if Turkey is going to have any ability to enter into the international organization.
Thus, in these early years after coming to power, the AKP put pressure to reform military actions. Namely, they worked to stop torture, extrajudicial killings, etc Kocamaner, In two short decades his country, and most dramatically its long-neglected Anatolian hinterland, has moved from relative poverty and provincialism to relative wealth and sophistication.
An inward-looking nation that exported little except labour has become a regional economic powerhouse, a tourist magnet as well as a haven for refugees, and an increasingly important global hub for energy, trade and transport. By every measure of living standards, the gap between Turkey and fellow members of the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, has shrunk markedly.
In addition, economic growth is now longer at the 6. This included increased discussions on human rights, a stronger judiciary, increased democratic practices, as well as a greater push for social services.
Again, as mentioned above, many have been happy with the direction that Turkey has gone, when looking at it from an economic lens. However, tension between the secularists and the Islamists rose in these years after the AKP party in Turkey took power.
But, the Islamists realized that this was causing friction in Turkey. They also understood that advancing too much of an Islamist agenda would not only raise red flags, but in the case of Turkey, as history taught them, could get them disbanded as a political party. Thus, they approached certain issues, all the while ignoring calls for other Islamist agenda points. Then, in response to this, Erdogan decided to hold snap elections.
This attempt to show the military that he had public support worked: the AKP in Turkey won 47 percent of all votes, which was 13 percent higher than their vote total in However, the court did cut state funding for the AKP, as a sign that they believe some anti-secular activities were taking place Tait, Following this close call, Erdogan and the AKP made sure that the military was no longer a problem for them with regards to running the country.
In , through a constitutional referendum, the Turkish citizens approved changes which included, among other things, a shift in the number of judges on the Constitutional Court the number increased to 17 , and also who got to choose them the President was able to choose 14 of the seats.
Furthermore, f ollowing a dispute between the military chief of state and Erdogan, a series of resignations took place among top military post. Then, in , the Turkish government arrested many military leaders for a plot to take over the state. Despite the initial democratic reforms, and strong economic programs and development under Erdogan and the AKP, events in recent years have suggested that the AKP Party has been moving towards more authoritarianism in the country.
Scholars argue that this shift towards authoritarianism in Turkey has especially been the case in recent years. This significant shift both in terms of increased judges, and also the change in selection of the positions allowed the AKP to put in judges more in line with their political and religious interests, in effect minimizing the influence of the secular parties, as well as the military. Then, in , the AKP won their third straight national election.
It was during this year that the AKP made a serious move on the military, attempting to reduce the power that it has had on the AKP and on Turkey in general for years. For example, in recent years, the AKP Party in Turkey has continued to criticize opposition groups, all the while looking to increase its hold on power, at the expense of other actors and institutions.
In the summer of , the government faced a series of protests by those who were frustrated with the AKPs disregard for environmental issues, the horrible treatment of ethnic and sexual minorities, the continued move towards authoritarianism, among other issues. The government response with police force. In fact, the response was clearly outside of what is understood as freedom of speech in a liberal democracy.
Over the next few months [following the initial protests on May of ], police repeatedly used unnecessary and abusive force, including tear gas, water cannons, and beatings, to prevent and disperse peaceful demonstrations.
By early July over 8, people had been injured. There is strong evidence linking the deaths of three protesters to the abusive use of force by police. This shift to a presidential system was orchestrated by Erdogan so that he could have increased power in the position. Running in the elections, Erdogan won the majority of the vote The idea would be that the elections would allow the President to directly carry out the will of the Turkish citizens.
The AKP party has criticized this former structure, in part because they viewed this system under Ataturk as rather authoritarian Ataturk did not allow opposition parties , and they saw overarching power by the military and secular judges. In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that Turkey is becoming more and more authoritarian and controlled under Erdogan. However, the police responded to these protests with violence. The AKP, in an attempt to reconnect contemporary Turkey with its Ottoman past, has also been willing to play up this religious symbolism, all the while working towards furthering their attempts at centralizing control over the politics of Turkey Seufert, According to the Turkish constitution, the Turkish president should cut ties with their or any political party in order to show that they are outside of party politics while holding this post.
Plus, it is believed the Erdogan expected Davutoglu to get out of the way as Erdogan continued his own policy interests in Turkey. He has also addressed the possibility of the resumption of a peace process with Kurdish rebels. Davutoglu not only spoke out against holding the journalists without them being tried, he has also suggested the possibility of peace with the Kurds in southern Turkey if Kurdish militant groups leave southern Turkey, whereas Erdogan vehemently opposes a solution that is not centered on military actions Fraser, However, this power was then given to Erdogan when he headed the AKP in In fact, right after this row between Erdogan and Davutoglu came the announcement that the prime minister would be resigning from his position later in May BBC, Again, it is expected that whoever will be selected will be someone greatly supportive of Erdogan.
Yildirim was chosen on a consensus. He is backed by many within the part, and has played an instrumental role in the development of the party, being one of the original members of the AKP Soguel, The proposal will go to a vote in June, but the AKP would need additional support from outside their party to approve this change Zee News, Since taking over the presidency, Erdogan and the AKP have embarked on a campaign of additional highly-authoritarian behavior.
For example, there has been a heavy crackdown on free journalism in Turkey. In fact, Turkey is one of the most oppressive countries in the world when it comes to the issue of journalists. There are many reasons why Turkey is ranked so poorly. It was due above all to the conditional release in of around 40 imprisoned journalists who nonetheless continue to face prosecution and could be detained again at any time.
Rocked by major corruption allegations, the government has done everything possible to rein in the influence of its new Public Enemy No. Also in , the government went after two journalists who reported on the government supplying weapons to the Islamist forces in Syria. They reported that a number of trucks were stopped by the Turkish security forces.
Erdogan has also arrested individuals who have posted anti-Erdogan or antigovernment comments on social media. The government was calling for the deletion of the video The Guardian, Turkey has tried to use the threat of terrorism to justify its actions.
This previously credible news outlet is now being controlled by the state, running pieces that are very supportive of Erdogan, the AKP, and the Turkish government. This happened after the court ruled that trustees now run the paper. There are a few proposed reasons as to why Erdogan may have wanted to do this. Some also believe that Erdogan and his family members might face some international law suits and, on the way to executive presidency goals, Erdogan would do his best to silence critical media outlets in the country as much as possible.
Another reason for this takeover in part is because of a greater political struggle between Erdogan and the AKP and Turkish imam Fethullah Gulen and his Hizmet movement. The way that Erdogan and the AKP Party have attempted to do this is by going after those currents who have rival power in the country. One of the most influential civil society movements in Turkey is Hizmet Service , which is an organization led by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen. Gulen is one of the most popular religious leaders in Turkey, and Hizmet has been active in providing social services in Turkey for years.
Gulen is most noted for the schools that he and the movement have organized, not only in Turkey, but throughout the world. Many individuals in positions of power have went through these Gulen-based schools.
It is for this reason that in recent years that Erdogan and the AKP has targeted supporters of Gulen. While the tension between the two has existed for well over a decade, and has been documented in academic works Muedini, , this rivalry became much more apparent in , not only when Gulen criticized the government for their violent response to protesters in Gezi Park and Taksim Square, but also after a corruption scandal broke in Turkey in December of Erdogan accused Gulen-based judges of ordering the investigation and arrests of these individuals.
Justice and Development Party
The party suffered a setback in the local elections , losing Istanbul and Ankara and other large cities, losses attributed to the Turkish economic crisis , accusations of authoritarianism, as well as alleged government inaction on the Syrian refugee crisis. Founded in , the party has a strong base of support among pious Muslims and arose from the conservative tradition of Turkey's Ottoman past and its Islamic identity,  though the party strongly denies it is Islamist. The party has been credited by many with passing a series of reforms from to that increased accessibility to healthcare and housing, distributed food subsidies, increased funding for students, improved infrastructure in poorer districts, privatized state-owned businesses, increased civilian oversight of the powerful military, overcame economic crises and oversaw high rates of growth of GDP and per capita income. The AKP government has also lifted bans on religious and conservative dress e. This has brought allegations that it is covertly undermining Turkish constitutional secular principles the Turkish constitution forbids sharia in the legal code or religious political parties, and courts have banned several parties for violating secular principles and led to two unsuccessful court cases attempting to close the party in and
Turkey’s Political Parties
Islamic groups have increasingly had a substantial political impact throughout the Muslim world. Analyzing the differences between various types of Islamic groups is crucial to understanding the multiple aspects of this impact. The first one is an Islamist political party, which aspires to a top-down Islamization of socio-political life. The second one is an Islamic movement, which seeks a more bottom-up Islamization. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
This is a particularly interesting phenomenon because the great majority of the opposition and other parties believe that the AKP has waged a war against agriculture and farmers with the aim of completely de-agrarianising the country and making it entirely dependent on agricultural imports. During the last fifteen years, the AKP has significantly transformed the Turkish economy, society, and politics. In the economic realm, by privatising the great majority of the state-owned enterprises, the AKP has finished the job that the relatively secular parties of the centre right and left started in the s but had not made comparable progress. In other words, Turkish neoliberalism has been consolidated under the AKP rule. On the other hand, by supporting the Islamist bourgeoisie much more than the secular bourgeoisie through generous government contracts, state bank credits and other favoritisms, AKP has taken significant progress although not completed yet in altering the balance of power within the Turkish bourgeoisie in favor of its Islamist wing.
Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
The Turkish elections of November brought a new Islamic-oriented political party to power, with almost two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. The success of AKP reflected the population's dissatisfaction with the ruling regime and its economic policy, but also constituted a major change in political Islam manifest in a significantly more liberal and pro-West discourse and program than its predecessors. There are disagreements over how sincere this change is and how long it can be sustained. Some argue that the AKP will eventually clash with Turkey's secular political and military establishment, while others expect that the AKP will gradually transform Turkey's political centre by making it more Islamic and less secular.
Коммандер Стратмор погиб. - Справедливость восторжествовала, как в дешевой пьесе. - Успокойтесь, Джабба, - приказал директор, - и доложите ситуацию. Насколько опасен вирус. Джабба пристально посмотрел на директора и вдруг разразился смехом. - Вирус? - Его грубый хохот разнесся по подземелью.
Turkey is the most recent and a very curious case where populism and neoliberalism concurred. After its economic crisis, not only the Turkish economy but.
AKP Party Turkey
Действительно закончилось. Теперь можно возвращаться домой. Кольцо на пальце и есть тот Грааль, который он искал. Беккер поднял руку к свету и вгляделся в выгравированные на золоте знаки. Его взгляд не фокусировался, и он не мог прочитать надпись, но, похоже, она сделана по-английски. Первая буква вроде бы О, или Q, или ноль: глаза у него так болели.
Тогда дело будет только за Дэвидом. Когда он найдет копию ключа, имевшуюся у Танкадо, оба экземпляра будут уничтожены, а маленькая бомба с часовым механизмом, заложенная Танкадо, - обезврежена и превратится во взрывное устройство без детонатора. Сьюзан еще раз прочитала адрес на клочке бумаги и ввела информацию в соответствующее поле, посмеялась про себя, вспомнив о трудностях, с которыми столкнулся Стратмор, пытаясь самолично запустить Следопыта. Скорее всего он проделал это дважды и каждый раз получал адрес Танкадо, а не Северной Дакоты. Элементарная ошибка, подумала Сьюзан, Стратмор, по-видимому, поменял местами поля информации, и Следопыт искал учетные данные совсем не того пользователя.
В чем дело? - спросил Джабба. Все прильнули к экрану и сокрушенно ахнули. Крошечная сноска гласила: Предел ошибки составляет 12. Разные лаборатории приводят разные цифры.
Если вы принесете мне его паспорт, я позабочусь, чтобы он его получил. - Видите ли, я в центре города, без машины, - ответил голос. - Может быть, вы могли бы подойти. - Понимаете, я не могу отойти от телефона, - уклончиво отозвался Ролдан. - Но если вы в центре, то это совсем недалеко от .
Нет, - сконфуженно ответила .